Does she honestly believe that a proper reading of the Establishment Clause, either in historical construction or in case law, results in the “high wall” of separation she clearly favors?
In any case, the dismissive claim that “God’s will cannot be a constitutional justification for a law that erases an individual right” has little to do with any serious understanding of the Establishment Clause.
The connections to her general reading of the Establishment Clause are obvious.
What sorts of broad public accommodations might the Constitution provide for religious groups?
Neither, for that matter, can the Greenhouse’s essay serves as a reminder that the law cannot function when individuals or groups see reality in such radically divergent ways. To begin with, stating that the Establishment Clause doesn’t justify referring to God’s will to deny rights is a straw man.
Commitment to the rule of law requires commitment to Constitutional principles, but under such serious disagreement about those principles the rule of law will devolve into mere coercion. She gives no indication of understanding the clause’s relationship to state establishments at the time of ratification, nor any sense of its relationship to the Free Exercise Clause.
Like Garner, Greenhouse believes that objections to abortion ultimately and exclusively arise from religious beliefs.
Granted, Greenhouse does provide accompanying evidence indicating that, in some instances, restrictions on abortion were accompanied either by overt religious justifications or implicit religious assumptions, or adorned with religious language.
Would it allow for the provision of basic public services to religious organizations, even if the taxpayer makes no use of, or has no use for, that organization?
Must the Establishment Clause be used in the most restrictive ways possible, to insure the complete absence of religion in public life?